This paper analyzes the future prospects for the use of the Theater Battle Arena (TBA) specifically, and Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) facilities in general, in conducting analysis for senior Air Force leadership. The desire is to broaden the use of the TBA in the arena of combat analysis. We believe that such a study would benefit other participants in the Advanced Distributed Simulation (ADS) environment as they plan, develop, construct, and upgrade facilities that take advantage of the still emerging ADS technology.
INTRODUCTION
The DIS Steering Committee (1994) published The DIS Vision and declared the primary mission of DIS was to define an infrastructure for linking live, virtual, and constructive simulations, at various locations, for the simulation of highly interactive activities (e.g., combat). The document also states that the infrastructure should provide an architecture and protocols for a seamless environment that supports: Though there was no specific mention of analysis, the missions of development of new concepts of operations, testing new systems, and design and prototyping imply a tie with analysis which thus far is not well specified.
The Pentagon is currently home to a single DIS facility, the Theater Battle Arena (TBA). The TBA, in addition to its access to the DIS environment, has developed a superb visual, graphic, and virtual capability 12 that can be linked to the exercises in which the TBA participates Several models, simulations, and simulators have also been included in this facility. BGEN Campbell, the Director of Modeling, Simulation and Analysis for the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force (Plans and Operations), outlined the TB,4's current mission. Again the idea of analysis is implied, but the role of DIS within the TBA with respect to analysis is not specifically stated. Dewars et al. (1994) outline the concerns that many in the analysis community have expressed about the role of DIS in analysis. The authors present a view of what the future of analysis might look like within the DIS architecture and proceed to outline a number of problems that must be overcome prior to using DIS to perform acceptable analysis. Many analysts from the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency (AFSAA), as well as from other services, are struggling to find an appropriate use of the DIS architecture and environment for analysis. Most admit the analysis attempts have fallen short of classic analytical standards. This paper documents the attempts of 9 officers to identify the current options available to the AFSAA analysts in using the TBA and its DIS environment.
The purpose of AFSAA is to provide the Chief of Staff of the Air Force with whatever analytical support he requires. Often, this means direct support of his initiatives. Less frequently, AFSAA is tasked to support other Air Staff agencies, and occasionally asked to support Major Commands such as #Lir Combat Command (ACC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), or the Air Fclrce Materiel Command (AFMC). Specific programs such as the B-1 bomber or the F-22 Fighter may also be directly supported with analysis. Currently, the AFSAA provides analytical support to the Air staff and the Air Force operations, acquisition, training, logistics, and research and development communities.
Theagency's motto, "ShedLight" accurately identifies the purpose and contribution within the Air Force.
With the shift from the Cold War world to a New World Order, heralded by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demand for quality analysis has not diminished. With the DIS environment allowing many of the models and simulations to be tied to virtual and live worlds, more questions are being asked as to the fidelity, credibility, and validity of the results and more analysis of these results is required. Although much of the technology and applications of technology is still emerging, AFSAA analysts want to know how to use the TBA for analysis, now.
The current focus of the TBA includes providing a graphical display as a visualization tool for presenting information to key decision-makers as they view an entire campaign or selected pieces of the battle. "A picture is worth a thousand words" is especially true when demonstrating the effects of a new weapon system or a new concept of operations. Such graphical and visualization capabilities are a major step forward, especially in communicating analytical results to highlevel decision makers. The current TBA vision also includes being able to run distributed simulations across a network in REAL TIME with ultimately thousands of entities participating.
The proof of the concept of a large-scale exercise has occurred but there are still many obstacles in the way of making such exercises commonplace; see DIS Steering Committee (1994) . The users of TBA want to move forward and implement AFSAA'S current suite of models within DIS exercises and utilizing DIS protocols. A number of difficulties have already arisen. The first problems are those that are common to most DIS exercises: q Adjudication issues over who shot whom, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), and conflicts over differences in fidelity between models. (The highest fidelity model is not always used to adjudicate combat results.) q Synchronization issues of addressing time step vs. event step. How to filter and use the massive quantities of data.
All of these issues remain open at this time and provide some idea of the scope of the problem. Because of the U.S. Army's greater experience in the DIS arena, the Air Force should be able to draw on this experience to gain insight into the use of DIS. Within the Army analytic community there has been a practice of maintaining a division between models and simulations which are used for training and those used for analysis. We believe that most models built to accomplish everything well (i.e., accurately, quickly, consistently) usually result in models that are not very good at anything. One of the most widely used high resolution land combat models is JANUS.
Up until 1994, JANUS actually had a separate model accredited for training (JANUS-T) and one for analysis (JANUS-A); see Joint Staff (1989 Figure  1) to include virtual models and to show the scope of simulations capable of being connected within the DIS environment. In general, there is now a capability to provide feedback during an exercise and the capability to include a number of different types of models in a single scenario. This advantage comes with some problems (which at this point are unresolved). Major among these problems is the issue of connecting a number of models which have different levels of fidelity within them. An example of this problem would be an Air Force model of a close air support mission dropping a guided bomb unit The introduction of the ability to play more Humanin-the-Loop (HITL) simulations translates into more fidelity given a specific person on a specific day. Including HITL does not mean we are any closer to the expected or average performance.
However, there is now an opportunity to examine a number of human factors issues which have in the past been ignored in military modeling due to the inability to effectively inchrde them in large exercises or in key decision making roles.
A recent example of human factors inclusion was a study accomplished by AFSAA where F-15 simulators were used at the MacAir facility to examine pilot response times and decision sequences. The results of this study were then used within the BRAWLER (a high resolution, air-to-air simulation) analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed F-22 fighter.
Areas of Opportunity: Figure 2 shows a view of the current modeling and simulation environment within the Air Force.
This graphic indicates at least three options for examining the use of a DIS facility for analytical purposes.
At AFSAA, as at most combat analysis agencies, there exist both high resolution (detailed, engineering-level, one vs. one models) and low resolution (aggregated, campaign/theater level, many vs. many) models.
At all levels within this structure the impact of the HITL could be a key factor in determining the combat effects of operations, new weapon systems, and new tactics. Hence, human factors analysis can and should be part of the entire spectrum of simulations until the analysis resolution drops down so far on the engineering scale that we are modeling lpackets and electrons rather than systems controlled by a human. In other words, the decision making ability of the human involved is often much more important than how quickly the decision is made. The decisions may depend upon the amount of information available, the quality of the information, and the idiosyncrasies of the decision maker.
This may affect the execution of an exercise by running either faster or slower than real-time when the other simulations are assuming real-time.
Simulations that are implemented entirely in-house, without a link to remote players, are more flexible, more controllable, and can still be run using DIS protocols.
In-house simulations can usually run much faster than DIS (i.e., external) simulations, allowing jumps to critical decision points and possibly more analysis per hour. This is currently hardware, bandwidth, and facility dependent and will be so for the next few years; see DIS Steering Committee (1994) .
HIGH RESOLUTION MODELING
The opportunities for high resolution analysis in the short term focus on the acquisition analysis of system level prototypes in a virtual "fly before you buy" arena. The concept of virtual prototyping will be a valuable one as systems become even more complex, expensive, and difficult to produce particularly as budgets continue to contract.
The systems, or at least the important characteristics of the systems, can be modeled and experimented with in a DIS environment.
Analysis of the modeled characteristics will be easily controlled and much less expensive and dangerous to accomplish. The TBA advantage of visualizing both the experiments and the results of the analysis leads to rapid identification of deficiencies in a system and appropriate adjustments to the system requirements.
Much of the more aggregated analysis is based on parameters estimated after a high resolution modeling effort.
A good example is the aggregate air model THUNDER;
see Joint Staff (1994), basing its attrition coefficients on the Hi-Res simulation BRAWLER; see Joint Staff (1989) .
The link to human factors is now obvious since BRAWLER parameters have been updated based upon recent human factors analysis in the DIS environment ; see DIS Steering Committee ( 1993).
The Warbreaker facility (a DIS facility maintained by ARPA) has proven that Hi-Res analysis can be done within a DIS facility, at least at a local level; see Case (1995) .
ARPA has assessed system capabilities of the virtual system High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aeronautical Vehicle (HAE UAV) within their facility and plan several more tests in 1995. Some of the tests involve linkage to other assets which can only be elsewhere in the DIS environment.
The type of analysis that may be applicable to the TBA would be an evaluation of similar systems that have been offered as solutions to previously identified operational problems. Similar to the Warbreaker facility, different systems could be rated on their effects upon the execution and success of a campaign plan. For example, a UAV and a SR-71 (reconnaissance plane) could each be utilized in attempting to intercept an enemy missile during the early portion of its flight (called the boost phase intercept scenario). The systems, one of which is a virtual system, would be rated on their ability to assist in the overall goal of destroying the enemy missiles.
Feasibility testing of future operational concepts has been discussed as a valuable use of the TBA. To visually watch a perhaps eccentric tactic be explored during a DIS exercise helps the decision maker verify the exact actions he (she) intended, watch the effects of such tactics, and essentially analyze for himself the value of the operational concept.
As always, there is danger in such experiments that one or two initial results will be accepted as 'truth'.
The need for the ability to conduct analysis within a designed experiment is evident.
Of the uses discussed, the most promising Hi-Res analysis application in the TBA would be system requirements analysis. The advantages of the TBA allow integration of the inputs of live/HITL results to the generally constructive modeling effort. Instances of this type of analysis are already being planned and accomplished at Warbreaker, the Tactical Air Command and Control Simulation Facility (TACCSF), and TBA.
There are drawbacks and limitations of Hi-Res analysis using DIS, including: 1. Establishment of a standard resolution level --HiRes may connote engineering level of resolution, one entity per weapon system, or one entity per small unit or group of weapon systems. 2. Adjudication of combat --Controlling the killervictim scoreboard and selecting the "right" fidelity model to determine the outcome of a firing event. 3. Actual data collected would be Hi-Res model dependent --Since the data comes from every model involved in the exercise, the results would have mixed levels of fidelity, even if the models have the same level of resolution.
4. Common, large scale exercises using remote DIS sites are still a hope of the future--only a proof of concept has occurred (e.g., the STOW-E exercise).
There are bandwidth problems and coordination problems. The TBA has some specific limitations that are not necessarily DIS limitations:
1. Data collection limitations. Sufficient manpower, hardware, and software are necessary for capturing, filtering, and analyzing large amounts of raw data. A smart data collection capability, e.g. one that could identify the appropriate data needed for a specified purpose, is needed.
A graphical user interface (GUI) would be desirable for this task. Filters are a necessity since the number of PDUS generated during a relatively small exercise is too large to store completely.
A database capable of easy manipulation by an analyst is also a necessity. Hi-Res to others means every soldier in the ground combat battle throughout the theater.
Still, to others, Hi-Res connotes engineering level or even molecular level simulation. For instance, EADSIM assigns an entity to every weapon system being played.
To some this is a Hi-Res simulation model. However, EADSIM does not simulate the flight of a missile down to the molecular or engineering level. Therefore, many consider the model to be a Low-Res model with respect to missile fly-out. In addition, Hi-Res does NOT go hand-in-hand with low-level since missile defense and theater level time-critical targets (TCTS) are simulated in relatively high resolution but are not low-level threats.
They are analyzed and controlled at the Corps, Theater, or Campaign level.
Many of the limitations listed above could be fixed with increased funding, staffing, and space. In an era of limited resources, innovative solutions to the limitations or adjustment of the types and scope of analysis desired are necessary. This is an area for further research by the simulation, analysis, and modeling communities.
LOW RESOLUTION MODELING
The current aims of low resolution (Lo-Res) modeling typically include supporting the Warfighters by identifying problems in the joint concept of operations execution, supporting planners and trainers with future campaign analyses which focus on doctrinal issues, and supporting force structure analysis. Force structure analysis will increase in importance as weapon system justification will be linked to its contribution to the joint combat effectiveness, e.g., Mobility, Space, C31ZEW.
Because Lo-Res simulations and models assume entities are aggregations of lower level entities (e.g., a battalion represents 700 soldiers), fewer entities, at a given scope, are required than in a Hi-Res simulation. However, in DIS a Lo-Res model is still tied to real-time because of its linkage to Hi-Res models also playing in the exercise and as the scope of the Lo-Res model increases, the number of Hi-Res simulation entities (and PDUS) drastically increase. Therefore the limitation of bandwidth is just as serious with Lo-Res modeling. If the simulation is contained totally within the facility, without using DIS protocols, then the advantages of LoRes simulations can be realized.
These advantages are well-defined and discussed in Hartmann (1985) .
Data collection in Lo-Res exercises has different problems.
The objectives of a Lo-Res exercise are necessarily different and require more intelligent data gathering. There are more types of information that can be analyzed in a high-level, Lo-Res environment and require more flexible and easier to use databases and information analysis tools.
The staffing and limitations discussed in regards to the Hi-Res analysis are exacerbated in a Lo-Res environment.
Example: THUNDER often requires several months for scenario development along with a large staff. The conflict itself may only be a 1 week, theater level war.
There is a valid concern that DIS and Lo-Res/highlevel models are not compatible.
DIS implies real time, while most aggregated models do not.
DIS allows human interaction, most high-level models only allow human interaction at the highest levels (EAGLE is a model that does allow human interaction at intermediate levels).
Aggregated models can be run as stand alone systems and do not need the coordination and overhead that the DIS system needs.
The aggregation and disaggregation required to run Lo-Res models simultaneously with Hi-Res models currently used in DIS exercises has not been solved.
The best project todate to solve this aggregation problem has been the EAGLE-BDS-D project which has made some significant strides towards improving vertical compatibility.
All of these concerns must be addressed before a capability discussed in the first section of this paper can be realized.
Aggregated This could be used for developing doctrine or for building a guideline for choosing courses of action (COAS).
CONCLUSIONS
Similar to the experience of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community in the 1980s, DIS/ADS has probably been oversold.
AI was hailed as the savior of the OR community, capable of solving all problems and developing new paradigms for analysis. As AI failed to deliver on the more grandiose (and unachievable) claims, it lost credibility within much of the scientific community.
However, within narrow realms AI has made a great impact, e.g. the use of rule-based expert systems for diagnostics in the medical community.
To preclude DIS/ADS from experiencing a similar setback, we must address the limitations, and obstacles involved in pursuing the advancements that draw us closer to an ADS training and analysis environment.
The coordination of a DIS facility, like the TBA, would be constrained by resources, money, and time. The proper staffing would be in excess of current TBA manning levels and would probably require at least a Supervisor, 2 mid-level analysts, a hardware manager, and 3 to 5 additional junior analysts.
A final conclusion is that a DIS facility, like the TBA, should serve as a tool for analysts in AFSAA rather than a stand alone analysis cell. The TBA members should be technical experts in a given area such as data collection, DIS protocols, or design of experiments.
The analysts (e.g. in AFSAA) would would consider the appropriateness of using the TBA in the analysis.
If appropriate, the facility would be scheduled. The TBA staff would work with the analyst to design an experiment appropriate for the task.
Alternative Uses: Although this paper has presented a discussion of uses of DIS facilities in performing operational, system requirements, and human factors analysis from a purely military perspective, the DIS environment offers many potential] y profitable opportunities to commercial, industrial, and political decision mlakers and analysts. 
